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Notes
A RAPID AND ACCURATE PCR TEST FOR CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
COVID-19 VACCINE MANDATES: THE APPROPRIATE
STANDARD OF REVIEW ADOPTED BY
KLAASSEN V. TRUSTEES OF INDIANA UNIVERSITY
“Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted
license to act according to one’s own will. It is only freedom
from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment
of the same right by others.”1
NATALIE ANDERSON*
I. COVID

AND THE

CONSTITUTION

Tony Roman owns a restaurant in California where an “un-vaccination policy” is in place: to enter the restaurant patrons must show proof
that they have not been vaccinated.2 Roman has refused to comply with
any and all government restrictions since the beginning of the pandemic,
and he refers to the executive branch that creates the restrictions as “tiny
tyrants.”3 Roman feels that the “American way of life is under attack” and
has pledged the restaurant as a “Constitutional Battleground[.]”4
Meanwhile, Americans are still dying of COVID-19 at alarming rates
over a year after the vaccine was made widely available.5 Death rates
* J.D. Candidate, 2023, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2016, Boston College. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Drew Anderson
and Jane Lee, who are my lifelong editors. It is also dedicated to my favorite conversation partner, Sean Proctor, because without his curiosity and thoughtfulness I
would never have decided to write on this topic. I would like to thank all the
members of the Villanova Law Review who helped me edit this Note. I certainly
would not have gotten to this point without you.
1. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26–27 (1905).
2. See Vikki Vargas & Jonathan Lloyd, ‘Proof of Being Unvaccinated Required’ at
Huntington Beach Restaurant, NBC L.A., (Jul. 28, 2021, 11:49 AM), https://
www.nbclosangeles.com/news/coronavirus/southern-california-coronavirus/
proof-of-being-unvaccinated-required-huntington-beach-restaurant-basilicos-coronavirus-vaccine/2649152/ [https://perma.cc/3EJV-UCW9] (reporting on Roman’s belief that mandatory vaccinations threaten the “American way of life”).
3. Id. (quoting Roman as saying, “[W]hen the tiny tyrants go on the attack
with new mandates, we fire back launching new missiles of defiance”).
4. Id. (reporting that Roman “feel[s] blessed to be on the front lines of this
battle in defense of Liberty and Freedom” and that he will “put everything at risk
for it”).
5. See Julie Bosman & Lauren Leatherby, U.S. Coronavirus Death Toll Surpasses
700,000 Despite Wide Availability of Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 1, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/10/01/us/us-covid-deaths-700k.html [https://perma.cc/
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among unvaccinated Americans are disturbingly and disproportionally
high.6 The choice to remain unvaccinated has not only affected those
who believe it is their right to be free from unwanted vaccination; it has
also had dire consequences on the vaccinated population as well.7
To say COVID-19 has affected global culture is an understatement—
and the legal system is not immune to its effect.8 COVID-19 will change
many different aspects of the legal system, including how the criminal justice system deals with mass incarceration, how regulators perform their
duties, how entrepreneurs will launch new ventures, and more.9 The pandemic will also glaringly affect how courts balance protecting citizens during a public health crisis with protecting people’s Fourteenth Amendment
rights.10 This question has not been answered uniformly, with different
3HYF-KPF5] (noting that 100,000 people have died from COVID-19 since midJune 2021, although the vaccine was widely available to the general public).
6. See id. (“An overwhelming majority of Americans who have died [from
COVID-19] in recent months, a period in which the country has offered broad
access to shots, were unvaccinated.”).
7. See World Health Organization, The Effects of Virus Variants on COVID-19 Vaccines, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/the-effects-of-virus-variants-on-covid-19-vaccines [https://
perma.cc/H8BJ-F78U] (“When a virus is widely circulating in a population and
causing many infections, the likelihood of the virus mutating increases.”); see also
Bosman & Leatherby, supra note 5 (noting that 2,900 of the 100,000 deaths due to
COVID-19 were vaccinated persons). The World Health Organization (WHO)
notes that changes in the virus could affect the efficacy of the vaccine because the
vaccine is based on a particular strain of the virus, and if the strain changes, so
does a vaccine’s success rate. See World Health Organization, supra.
8. See Coronavirus Death Toll, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/
coronavirus/coronavirus-death-toll/ [https://perma.cc/A5BA-4WCU] (last visited
Feb. 23, 2021) (providing the current death toll globally of the COVID-19 pandemic); see also Claire Parins & Claire Stamler-Goody, How COVID-19 Could Change
the Law, U. CHI. L. SCH. (Oct. 16, 2020), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/
how-covid-19-could-change-law [https://perma.cc/5YPA-AY27] (interviewing law
school faculty about how they think the pandemic will change the law). At the
time of publication, the COVID-19 pandemic has killed over 5.9 million people
across the globe. See Coronavirus Death Toll, supra. Over half a million people in
the US have died from COVID-19, making it the third leading cause of death in
the U.S. in 2021. See Joe Murphy & Jiachuan Wu, Map: Track Coronavirus Deaths
Around the World, NBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2021, 10:21 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/world/world-map-coronavirus-deaths-country-covid-19n1170211 [https://perma.cc/5DMJ-V8Y5] (reporting that in the U.S., 945,765
people had died from COVID-19 by February 2022); Jared Ortaliza, Kendal
Orgera, Krutika Amin, & Cynthia Cox, COVID- 19 Leading Cause of Death Ranking,
PETERSON-KFF (Feb. 4, 2022) (reporting that in January 2022, COVID-19 was the
second leading cause of death in the U.S.), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/
brief/covid-19-leading-cause-of-death-ranking/ [https://perma.cc/5AQ3-CGJ8].
9. See Parins & Stamer-Moody, supra note 8 (explaining how different law
school faculty feel about how COVID-19 will change their field of law).
10. See Scott Bomboy, Current Constitutional Issues Related to Vaccine Mandates,
NAT’L CONST. CTR. (Aug. 6, 2021), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/currentconstitutional-issues-related-to-vaccine-mandates [https://perma.cc/SE4K-XJCN]
(explaining the complexity of the legal questions surrounding vaccine mandates).
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states creating varying legislation regarding the reach of mandatory vaccine requirements.11
Klaassen v. Trustees of Indiana University12 represents the first time a
court has considered the constitutionality of a public institution’s
mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.13 This Note argues that Klaassen
presents the correct application of constitutional analysis, which is rational
basis review, for questions regarding vaccine mandates during a public
health crisis and creates clarity where there is confusion.14 Further, this
Note also asserts that Klaassen holds that COVID-19 vaccination mandates
are constitutional, which sets an unquestionable precedent for future
cases.15 Part II delves into the history of mandatory vaccination case law
and highlights important cases that have been litigated during the COVID19 pandemic. Next, Part III discusses the facts and procedural history of
Klaassen. Part IV explores the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana’s holding that the correct mode of constitutional
analysis when addressing a question of health during a pandemic is rational basis review. Then, Part V provides a critical analysis of the district
court’s holding and asserts that its holding is the correct application of
both Jacobson v. Massachusetts and Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo,16 which
are two Supreme Court decisions on the issue. Finally, Part VI illustrates
the impact that the Indiana district court’s holding will have on other jurisdictions when faced with similar questions and how its holding will become important precedent in the future.

11. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 16-39-11-5 (West 2021) (outlawing the use of
“vaccine passports”), with City of New York Office of the Mayor, Emergency Executive
Order No. 225, NYC.GOV (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/
downloads/pdf/executive-orders/2021/eeo-225.pdf [https://perma.cc/777GC6EB] (mandating that all New York City residents must show proof of vaccination
if they want to participate in indoor activities) [hereinafter N.Y.C. Executive Order].
12. No. 1:21-CV-238 DRL, 2021 WL 3073926 (N.D. Ind. July 18, 2021), aff’d 7
F.4th 592 (7th Cir. 2021).
13. See id. at *15 (“No case to date has decided the constitutionality of
whether a public university, such as Indiana University, may mandate that its students receive a COVID-19 vaccine.”).
14. See id. at *21 (noting that the correct constitutional mode of analysis for
questions regarding a public health crisis is rational basis review, which is inherently what Jacobson v. Massachusetts dictated). For further discussion about the correct constitutional review see infra notes 158–89 and accompanying text.
15. See id. at *46 (noting that “the Fourteenth Amendment permits Indiana
University to pursue a reasonable and due process of vaccination”).
16. 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
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II. BEFORE MODERNA, PFIZER, AND JOHNSON & JOHNSON: A HISTORY
VACCINATION LAW

OF

While society is intently focused on current vaccination litigation, vaccination case law has existed since the early twentieth century.17 This precedent predates the implementation of modern constitutional analysis but
still influences today’s litigation.18 These cases often require courts to analyze the Fourteenth Amendment, which holds that no State shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”19
Some litigants have argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections
extend to their refusal of the COVID-19 vaccine under the recognized
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, which the Amendment does
protect.20 Neither the courts nor the legislature have uniformly answered
this question of whether mandatory COVID-19 vaccinations violate a person’s Fourteenth Amendment right.21
For over a century, states have enacted legislation which requires students to be vaccinated against infectious diseases other than COVID-19.22
For example, in 1903, the New York Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the mandatory vaccine statute that the state legislature had
enacted in 1893.23 During World War II, the U.S. government mandated
that all men enlisting had to get vaccinated against typhoid, yellow fever,
and tetanus.24 This legislative trend has continued into the twenty-first
century; today all fifty U.S. states have some sort of legislation that requires
17. See generally Viemeister v. White, 84 N.Y.S. 712 (N.Y. App. Div. 1903) (being the first case to analyze the constitutionality of mandatory vaccine requirements in 1903).
18. See id. at 713–14 (deciding a case relating to vaccination requirements in
1903); Harris v. University of Ma. Lowell, No. 1:21-cv-11244, 2021 WL 3848012, at
*1 (D. Mass. Jul 30, 2021) (deciding a case on mandatory vaccinations in a public
school in 2021).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. See Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at *1 (entertaining a claim brought by
students that the University’s mandatory vaccination requirement violates the students’ Fourteenth Amendment rights); see also, Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Mo.
Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“The principle that a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”).
21. See id. at *15 (deciding the constitutionality of the COVID-19 vaccine);
IND. CODE ANN. § 20-34-4-2 (West 2015) (requiring vaccinations, not particular to
COVID-19, in Indiana schools); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-39-11-5 (West 2021) (outlawing the requirement of proof of vaccination in Indiana).
22. See Dorit R. Reiss, Litigating Alternative Facts: School Vaccine Mandates in the
Courts, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 207, 208 (2018) (describing the history of vaccination
law and how it started over a century ago in the United States).
23. See Viemeister, 84 N.Y.S. at 713 (addressing the constitutionality of section
200, c.661, p.1556, Laws 1893, which mandated that school children should be
vaccinated to attend school).
24. See The Long History of Vaccine Mandates in America, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17,
2021, 10:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-long-history-of-vaccine-mandates-in-america-11631890699 (explaining how the war effort spurred vaccination
rates as well as vaccination technology).
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specified vaccines for students.25 Yet, when it comes to the COVID-19 vaccine, some states have changed their policies and banned COVID-19 vaccination requirements.26 With states treating the COVID-19 vaccine
differently, Congress has been unable to provide a collective answer to the
issue of whether mandating the vaccine would be a violation of a person’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights.27
Similarly, courts have yet to provide a unified answer as to the constitutionality of executive-ordered COVID-19 social distancing and masking
mandates.28 Inconsistent outcomes in litigation deciding the constitutionality of these different executive orders has created confusion as to the
constitutionality of any pandemic-related restrictions, including vaccine
mandates.29
Section A explores the vaccination case law that predates the modern
tiers of constitutional analysis of rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Then, Section B looks at the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the constitutionality of COVID-19 restrictions. Lastly, Section C
discusses the impact of the Supreme Court’s rulings on lower courts and
their interpretations of the Supreme Court’s holdings.

25. See States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization
Requirements, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 10, 2022), https://
www.ncsl.org/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/JR57-46JZ] (noting which states have mandatory vaccine requirements for students and which states allow for certain exemptions).
26. See Elliott Davis, States Are Banning COVID-19 Vaccine Requirements, U.S.
NEWS (Apr. 30, 2021, 4:54 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2021-04-30/these-states-are-banning-covid-19-vaccine-requirements
[permalink unavailable] (reporting that Arkansas, Montana, and South Carolina
advanced legislation that bans requirements such as proof of COVID-19 vaccination as a condition of employment as of April 2021).
27. Compare id. (noting states that have banned vaccine requirements), with
N.Y.C. Executive Order, supra note 11 (mandating that in New York City all residents
must show proof of vaccination if they want to participate in indoor activities).
28. Compare Big Tyme Invs., v. Edwards, 985 F.3d 456, 460 (5th Cir. 2021)
(holding that the governor’s restrictions against bars during the COVID-19 pandemic did not violate constitutional rights), with Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo,
983 F.3d 620, 625 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that the Governor’s restriction against
places of worship during COVID-19 pandemic did violate constitutional rights). It
should be noted that the courts have yet to provide much substance on the issue of
the constitutionality of COVID-19 vaccine requirements since litigation is commencing now, and as such the courts’ indication as to constitutionality will be analyzed under the scope of COVID-19 restrictions. See Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ.,
No.1:21-CV-238 DRL, 2021 WL 3073926, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 18, 2021), aff’d 7
F.4th 592 (7th Cir. 2021) (being the first to determine the question of constitutionality of a COVID-19 vaccine mandate in public schools).
29. See Jones v. Cuomo, 542 F. Supp. 207, 216–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing different outcomes in different jurisdictions regarding COVID-19 regulations and
how they are handled).
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Consumption, Apoplexy, and Blood Letting: Vaccine Case Law Prior to
Modern Tiered Constitutional Analysis

Case law regarding vaccine requirements predates what is considered
modern constitutional analysis.30 As early as 1903, courts grappled with
the issue of mandatory vaccine requirements in schools.31 In Viemeister v.
White32 the court considered the lawfulness of a public school’s refusal to
admit a student due to lack of vaccination.33 Such a refusal was lawful and
was “not in conflict with any of the definitions of the ‘law of the land,’ for
it operate[ed] equally upon every person who is, or who may desire to
become, a pupil in our public schools.”34 This determination was not
based on modern tiers of constitutional analysis but was concerned with
the general applicability of the law and making sure it did not target one
group versus another.35 The court gave extreme deference to the legislature to make decisions that were for the good of all, and if the law was not
applied fairly across the public, it was up to the legislature to change it—
not the courts.36
Two years later, the Supreme Court commented on the validity of
mandatory vaccination requirements in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.37 In
Jacobson, the Court was asked to determine if the City of Cambridge’s
mandatory vaccination policy that required all residents get the smallpox
vaccine or pay a fine of five dollars was constitutional.38 Such a mandate
was deemed constitutional, and the Court recognized a two-pronged test
to determine the constitutionality of a claim regarding a public health cri30. See Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at *17 (noting that to answer the question
about the constitutionality of a mandatory vaccine mandate the court must assess
material that predates the modern tiers of constitutional analysis). The court in
Klaassen describes modern constitutional analysis as having levels of standard of
review such as strict scrutiny and rational basis review. Id.
31. See Viemeister v. White, 84 N.Y.S. 712, 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1903) (deciding
whether a student could be blocked from attending school because the student
was not vaccinated).
32. Id.
33. See generally id. (considering whether a statute which compelled students
to get vaccinated to be admitted to school is in conflict with fundamental law).
34. Id. at 716 (“We fail to discover that the statute in question violates any
specific guaranty[.]”).
35. See id. at 714 (holding that the test for constitutionality of a law is based on
if the conduct is uniform and affects “alike the legislator, his family, his neighbors
and friends”).
36. See id. (noting that the foundation of representative government is the
presumption that the legislature will act wisely and “in the interests of all of the
people” and that if a law is not within the interest of the people, then the legislature must remedy it and it “cannot be done by the courts.”).
37. 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905) (deciding a vaccine mandate in 1905).
38. See id. at 22–23 (“What, according to the judgment of the state court, are
the scope and effect of the statute? What results were intended to be accomplished by it? These questions must be answered.”).
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sis.39 First, to address the issue of the constitutionality of a public health
policy, the law must have a “real or substantial relation” to “the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety,” and, second, must not be a
“plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.”40 In
applying this test in Jacobson, the Court first determined that the mandate
was related to public health in that it was “employed to stamp out the
disease of smallpox[.]”41 Second, the Court noted that the mandate did
not violate any right that is secured by the Constitution because the legislature was in the best position to make choices regarding the majority of
citizens in the Commonwealth, and it was not for the judicial branch to
second guess those decisions.42 Again, the Supreme Court gave deference
to the state legislature’s actions, noting that “the legislature has the right
to pass laws which, according to the common belief of the people, are
adapted to prevent the spread of contagious diseases[,]” and that “no
court, much less a jury, is justified in disregarding the action of the legislature simply because in its or their opinion that . . . method was . . . not the
best[.]”43 Finally, the Court noted the importance of exceptions to mandates, explaining that there are some reasons a person may need to assert
their own personal will.44 Yet the Court found that this right to “dispute
the authority of any human government” was satisfied because exceptions
39. Id. at 26 (noting that the Constitution “does not import an absolute right
in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from
restraint”).
40. Id. at 31 (determining that the judiciary can “review legislative action in
respect of a matter affecting the general welfare” and that intrusion can only happen when the legislature has created a law that violates the two-pronged test of
purpose of the statute and effect on fundamental law).
41. Id. (asserting that the methods employed to “stamp out the disease of
smallpox” had a “real and substantial relation to the protection of the public
health and the public safety”).
42. See id. at 38 (recognizing that the safety and health of the people of Massachusetts is best left to the Commonwealth to protect). It is important to note that
the plaintiff in error did not assert a clear constitutional right that the mandatory
vaccination requirement violated, instead he just purported that the vaccine was
dangerous and could cause death. Id. at 36. To answer this particular call for relief, the Court would need to decide if the plaintiff in error or the government was
right about the danger of the vaccine. Id. at 37. The court declined to do so and
noted that they were ill situated to make that decision and the legislative branch
was more well equipped to make the decision about the safety and effectiveness of
the vaccine. Id. This language may have informed lower courts that rationalize
that Jacobson set a lower standard of deference when considering constitutional
issues relating to public health crisis. See Big Tyme Invs. v. Edwards, 985 F.3d 456,
466 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that in times of public health crisis, some constitutional rights can be suspended).
43. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35 (explaining that because it is the common belief of the public and medical professionals that vaccination stops the spread of
smallpox, the legislature is in the best position to determine whether that is a valid
reason for enacting a law, not the judiciary).
44. See id. at 29 (“There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual
may assert the supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any
human government . . . .”).
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were made to the vaccine mandate, including exceptions for children and
the exception of paying a fine rather than being vaccinated.45
Twenty-two years later, the Supreme Court decided Buck v. Bell46 and
relied on Jacobson to declare the involuntary sterilization of a woman constitutional.47 The plaintiff in Buck argued that the sterilization order violated substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that
there were “no circumstances” under which the order could be justified.48
The Court reasoned that:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the
State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for
their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the
Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough.49
Modern commentators widely consider Buck a misapplication of justice and note that its holding cast doubt upon Jacobson and its relevance.50
45. Id. at 29–30. The Court importantly noted though that even though there
was an exception for children, this did not mean that the vaccine mandate violated
an adult’s equal protection of the law. Id. It stated that the “statute [was] applicable equally to all in like condition, and there are obviously reasons why regulations
may be appropriate for adults which could not be safely applied to persons of
tender years.” Id.
46. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
47. See id. at 205 (affirming the judgement of the lower court which ordered
the performance of salpingectomy which caused sterilization against the patient’s
wishes).
48. Id. at 205–07 (considering whether the statute which legalized plaintiff’s
sterilization is void under the Fourteenth Amendment because it denied her due
process of the law and equal protection of the laws).
49. Id. at 207 (citation omitted).
50. See Wendy K. Mariner, George J. Annas & Leonard H. Glantz, Jacobson v.
Massachusetts: It’s Not Your Great-Great-Grandfather’s Public Health Law, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 581, 584 (2005) (noting that “Jacobson was cited as support for the general
principle that public welfare was sufficient to justify involuntary sterilization”). It
should be noted that it is also recognized that Buck misapplied the test purported
in Jacobson, which sought to regulate based on public health necessity “through
reasonable regulation.” Rene F. Najera, Jacobson and the Contemporary Jurisprudence,
C. PHYSICIANS PHILA. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.historyofvaccines.org/content/
blog/jacobson-v-massachusetts-reiss-part-two [https://perma.cc/D9YV-5U6P] (emphasis added). It is generally accepted that vaccines provide benefits to those who
get them as well as protect society, and the “link between sterilization and public
health is speculative, weak, and unsupported with data.” Id.
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This led some courts to believe that Buck’s holding endorsed the suspension of personal fundamental rights in pursuit of the greater good.51
B.

Modern Medicine: Vaccine Case Law Under Modern Constitutional
Analysis

Over a century after Jacobson, the Supreme Court again ruled on the
constitutionality of legislative and executive mandates regarding
pandemics.52 In Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo,53 religious leaders asked
the Court to grant a preliminary injunction against the Executive Order
issued by New York’s governor Andrew Cuomo, which limited the number
of worshipers at places of worship.54 In granting the injunction, the Court
reasoned that the social distancing mandate was not “neutral because [it]
single[ed] out houses of worship for especially harsh treatment.”55 The
Court noted that other businesses that were deemed essential such as acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, and garages in the “red” and “orange”
zones—could admit as many people as they wanted.56 The Court stressed
that the restrictions were not of “‘general applicability’” and therefore
“must satisfy ‘strict scrutiny,’ and this means that they must be ‘narrowly
tailored’ to serve a ‘compelling’ state interest.”57 While the Court admitted that “[s]temming the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling interest,” the Executive Order was not narrowly tailored because it was
51. See, Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 1996) (referring to the
decision in Buck as repudiated); Chamul v. Amerisure Mutual Ins. Co., 486 S.W.3d
116, 117 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016) (referring to Buck as “much criticized”); Matter of
Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 821 (Colo. 1990) (referring to Buck and sterilization treatments as “largely discredited”).
52. See Roman Cath. Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (determining the
constitutionality of mask mandates in houses of worship).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 65–66 (“[A]pplications seek relief from an Executive Order issued
by the Governor of New York that imposes very severe restrictions on attendance at
religious services . . . .”).
55. Id. at 66 (pointing to comments made by the governor, which specifically
reference and target the “ultra-Orthodox [Jewish] community” to show the lack of
general applicability (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Agudath Isr. v. Cuomo, 989 F.3d 620, 625 (2d Cir. 2020) (Park, J.,
dissenting))).
56. Id. (noting that in “red” zones essential businesses can admit as many people as they would like, and in “orange” zones even non-essential businesses can
admit whomever they like while houses of worship are limited to 10 and 25 people
in “red” and “orange” zones respectively).
57. Id. at 67 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 546 (1993)). Notably, this type of analysis at once ushers the pandemic case
law into analysis that is governed by modern constitutional analysis by framing it in
terms of strict scrutiny, but it also harkens back to Viemeister v. White in that it
stresses the constitutional test is that it applies equally to all groups. For further
discussion about the court’s reasoning in Viemeister, see supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
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stricter than any other COVID-19 regulation—and stricter than necessary
to stop the spread.58
In his concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch commented on the lack of
influence that Jacobson had on the decision and called into question how it
did not provide a novel form of analysis to be employed during a public
health crisis.59 Justice Gorsuch made a clear distinction between the issue
at hand in Roman Catholic Diocese and the one in Jacobson, stating that the
right to not be vaccinated is an issue pertaining to bodily autonomy while
the one at hand is a violation of the First Amendment.60 Justice Gorsuch
criticized the lower court’s interpretations of Jacobson’s effect on constitutional analysis of public health orders.61 Notably, Justice Gorsuch instead
showed how Jacobson and modern constitutional analysis are not different,
stating that “this Court essentially applied rational basis review to Henning
Jacobson’s challenge to a state law . . . .”62
C.

Determining the Best Medical Treatment: Roman Catholic Diocese’s
Impact on Lower Courts

Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Roman Catholic Diocese, some
lower courts have adopted the strict scrutiny test described in the opinion
while others continued to apply lower standards of review for questions of
constitutionality of COVID-19 mandates.63 The Supreme Court’s analysis
in Roman Catholic Diocese left lower courts to consider whether Jacobson had
been effectively overruled or not.64
After the Supreme Court’s holding in Roman Catholic Diocese, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit put the final nail in the coffin for
58. Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 67 (comparing the restrictions to restrictions created by other similarly “hard-hit” areas to show that the Executive Order
was too specific to houses of worship).
59. Id. at 71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (querying as to why some lower courts
have mistaken Jacobson for “a towering authority that overshadows the Constitution
during a pandemic”).
60. Id. at 70–71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting that the right to bodily integrity does not have anything to do with the circumstances addressed, which are
concerned with the explicit right to religious exercise).
61. See id. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (claiming “Jacobson hardly supports
cutting the Constitution loose during a pandemic”).
62. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Put differently, Jacobson didn’t seek to depart from normal legal rules during a pandemic, and it supplies no precedent for
doing so.”).
63. See Big Tyme Invs. v. Edwards, 985 F.3d 456, 467 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding
that Jacobson is the ruling standard by which constitutional claims regarding public
health should be reviewed); Agudath Isr. v. Cuomo, 989 F.3d 620, 625 (2d Cir.
2020) (applying modern constitutional tiered analysis to public health constitutional questions); Jones v. Cuomo, 542 F. Supp. 207, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (applying
both modern constitutional evaluation to pandemic executive orders as well as
Jacobson).
64. See Jones, 542 F. Supp. at 218 (“In the wake of the Roman Catholic Diocese
decision, some courts’ confidence in Jacobson has . . . waned.”).
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the New York Governor’s Executive Order in Agudath Israel v. Cuomo.65 In
Agudath Israel, the Second Circuit again considered Governor Cuomo’s Executive Order, which classified areas of high COVID-19 infection rates as
“orange” or “red” zones.66 Specifically, it again addressed classifying
houses of worship as spreaders of COVID-19 and whether the imposition
of stricter prohibitions on them was constitutional.67 Ultimately, the court
held that the Executive Order was unconstitutional because it was “not
neutral on its face and impose[d] greater restrictions on religious activities[.]”68 The court utilized the modern mode of tiered constitutional
analysis when determining the constitutionality of the Executive Order.69
It followed the Supreme Court’s recommendation of the appropriate
mode of analysis and disregarded Jacobson as providing a standard of review.70 Through its opinion, the court endorsed the three-tiered framework for analyzing constitutional violations as the appropriate form of
analysis, and the court even went so far as to state that “courts may not
defer to the Governor simply because he is addressing a matter involving
science or public health.”71 Agudath Israel is an example of a lower court
determining that the tiered approach is the correct approach constitutional analysis for restrictions related to COVID-19 that are not of general
applicability.72
Conversely, in an opinion regarding the constitutionality of the Louisiana Governor’s Executive Order regarding bar operation at the height of
the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found
that such orders were constitutional in Big Tyme Investments v. Edwards.73
65. See Agudath Isr., 983 F.3d at 625 (confirming the Supreme Court’s injunction and holding that the executive orders were unconstitutional).
66. Id. at 626.
67. Id. at 625 (noting that the court is tasked with considering a First Amendment question as to whether the COVID-19 restrictions are constitutional).
68. Id. (enjoining the Governor from enforcing the Order’s ten- and twentyfive-person capacity limits on houses of worship).
69. Id. at 631, 633 (noting that strict scrutiny applies, and the restriction must
be narrowly tailored to withstand scrutiny). Modern tiers of constitutional analysis
are the separation of the standard of scrutiny into rational basis review and strict
scrutiny review. See Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., No. 1:21-CV-238 DRL, 2021 WL
3073926, at *17 (N.D. Ind. July 18, 2021), aff’d 7 F.4th 592 (7th Cir. 2021).
70. See Agudath Isr., 983 F.3d at 635 (stating that the governor’s reliance on
Jacobson was “misplaced”).
71. Id. The court rejected deference to the governor during times of public
health crises, which can be seen as interpretation of the standard purported in
Jacobson. See Big Tyme Invs. v. Edwards, 985 F.3d 456, 467 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting
that plaintiff argued that Jacobson called for “elevated deference” to the governor
beyond even modern rational basis jurisprudence (internal quotation marks omitted)). By deeming language commonly associated with Jacobson as improper
modes of analysis, the court in Agudath Israel implicitly rejected Jacobson as proper
precedent. See Agudath Isr., 983 F.3d at 635.
72. See Agudath Irs., 983 F.3d at 635 (noting the three-tiered framework was
created to consider exactly these types of constitutional questions).
73. See Big Tyme Invs., 985 F.3d at 460 (affirming the lower court’s denial of
injunctive relief based of a Fourteenth Amendment claim).
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The Fifth Circuit considered whether the Executive Order, which stated
that bars, with or without food service, could only be open for take-out
services while restaurants could be open for dine-in services, was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.74 The court held that such an
order was constitutional because the closure of bars had a “‘real or substantial relation’ to the public health crisis” because bars created a greater
risk of spread of COVID-19 as their primary purpose was for socialization
and patrons were more likely to be intoxicated and therefore less likely to
maintain appropriate social distance.75 The court further applied the
Jacobson test by noting that the Order was not “beyond all question, a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.”76 Because
the Executive Order was based simply on what type of business permit the
owner had, there was no violation of the Equal Protection Clause.77 By
relying on language found in Jacobson, the Court endorsed the mode of
analysis supported in Jacobson.78 The Fifth Circuit even went as far as endorsing the idea that Jacobson allows for greater deference during times of
public health crisis, noting “when faced with a society-threatening epidemic, a state may implement emergency measures that curtail constitutional rights . . . .”79
The United State District Court for the Southern District of New York
dealt with the confusion of the aftermath of Roman Catholic Diocese by analyzing the constitutionality of the Executive Order under a hybrid approach, applying both the Jacobson standard and modern tiered analysis, in
Jones v. Cuomo.80 The district court determined that New York’s fourteenday quarantine requirement for out-of-state travelers was constitutional
under both the Jacobson standard and the modern tiered approach.81
74. Id. at 461 (considering whether the Governor’s plan to reopen in phases,
which allows for some businesses to be open while others cannot, is
constitutional).
75. Id. at 463 (detailing the data which indicates that bars are spreaders of
COVID-19 for various reasons).
76. Id. at 466, 468 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)).
77. Id. (noting that classification due to business permit does not differentiate
on the basis of a suspect class). “Such a classification does not ‘run afoul of the
Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of
treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose.’ ” Id. (quoting Heller v.
Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
78. See id. at 467 (analyzing the issue with a two-part test that asks (1) whether
the order lacks a “real or substantial relation” to the COVID-19 crisis; and (2)
whether the order is a “plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law” (citing In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 784 (5th Cir. 2020))).
79. Id. at 466 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Abbott, 954
F.3d at 784).
80. See Jones v. Cuomo, 542 F. Supp. 207, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (holding that
“in an abundance of caution, the Court will assess the Executive Order . . . under
both Jacobson and the traditional tiers of scrutiny”).
81. See id. at 214–15 (rejecting the plaintiff’s claims under Jacobson and the
modern tiered analysis).
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While analyzing the issue under the Jacobson standard of review, the
court considered whether the fourteen-day quarantine requirement for
out-of-state travelers entering New York “bore ‘no real or substantial relation’ to the public health or was ‘a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law[.]’”82 The court determined that the
Executive Order related to public health because it was enacted with the
goal of curbing the transmission of COVID-19 from residents of states who
possessed “a mathematically heightened risk of spreading COVID-19.”83
Additionally, the Order did not violate a fundamental right because it did
not implicate any component of the right to travel.84 In utilizing the language from the test used in Jacobson, the district court recognized Jacobson
as good law that should be used in the analysis of constitutional questions
regarding a public health crisis.85
Yet, while marking Jacobson as good law, the district court showed hesitation when it analyzed the issue under the tiered approach and determined that even under modern constitutional analysis, the Executive
Order was still constitutional.86 Not only did the court use the tiered analysis, but it also applied strict scrutiny to the Executive Order.87 By submitting the mandate to strict scrutiny, the court defers to the standard
purported in Roman Catholic Diocese.88

82. Id. at 219 (alteration in original) (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 31, 25 (1905)) (“[C]ourts—as well as much of the public—are in agreement that COVID-19 is a highly infectious and potentially deadly disease . . . [and]
the quarantine period of fourteen days was reasonable in light of guidance from
the WHO.”).
83. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that New York was one of
the only states that was successfully curbing the spread of COVID-19 while other
states were still seeing a rise in cases, therefore New York had an interest in keeping its numbers low from a population that is more likely to have positive cases).
84. See id. at 220 (recognizing that the right to travel is fundamental but a law
“only implicates that right ‘when it actually deters such travel, [or] when impeding
travel is its primary objective . . . .’ ” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Town of Southhold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 53 (2d Cir. 2007))).
85. See id. at 218 (noting that Jacobson is “applicable on stare decisis grounds”
and “has direct application” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hopkins
Hawley v. Cuomo, No. 20 Civ. 10932 (PAC) 2021 WL 1895277, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 11, 2021))).
86. See id. at 222 (determining that the Executive Order withstands both strict
scrutiny and rational basis review).
87. See id. at 220 (stating that the right to travel is “ ‘firmly embedded’ in the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence” but the Executive Order has a compelling interest that is narrowly tailored (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999))).
88. See id. at 213 (noting that Roman Catholic Diocese called into question the
continued applicability of Jacobson). This hybrid type of analysis, where the court
considered the constitutionality of a pandemic order under both Jacobson and
modern tiers of constitutional analysis, is a perfect example of the confusion created by Roman Catholic Diocese. See id. at 213-14. In fact, the court was so uncertain
about the valid precedent that it resorted to using both just to be safe. Id. at 214.
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On May 21, 2021, Indiana University (“the University”) announced
that it was mandating the COVID-19 vaccine for its students, faculty, and
staff.89 This decision came after the University’s President created the
University Restart Committee, which the Executive Vice President for University Clinical Affairs and the School of Medicine Dean spearheaded.90
The University provided exceptions and alternatives to the vaccination
mandate, such as medical exemption, religious exemption, medical deferral, taking a semester off, attending online, or attending another university.91 If members of the University met any of these exceptions and
continued to attend in-person, they would be subject to a mask policy,
testing, and social distancing.92
In response, eight students sued the school and asked the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana to enforce a preliminary injunction to halt the imposition of the vaccine mandate until its
constitutionality can be determined.93 The students argued that the vaccine mandate, and the extra measures enforced if the students did qualify
for an exception, violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights.94 Of the
eight students who filed the action, six have received exemptions already,
one would qualify if she applied, and only one did not seem to qualify for

89. See Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., No.1:21-CV-238 DRL, 2021 WL 3073926,
at *1, *4 (N.D. Ind. July 18, 2021), aff’d 7 F.4th 592 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that
as a public institution, the University has statutory power to “pass all bylaws necessary to put into effect its powers” (citing IND. CODE. ANN. § 21-27-4-3 (West
2021))).
90. Id. at *5. This committee was made up of “fifteen members with expertise
in public health, epidemiology, virology, data modeling and monitoring, risk mitigation, health equity, health sciences, and law.” Id. at *13. The committee had
seven MDs on it who reviewed “guidelines from the CDC, IU Health, the ISDH, the
Indiana Governor’s Office . . . scientific literature and data, including COVID-19
case and hospitalization rates for Indiana.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Committee was presented to on new data almost weekly for six months.
Id.
91. Id. at *6 (determining that exemptions may be given if the University is
given a religious reason or is provided proof from a physician of an allergy to the
vaccine, the student is pregnant or breastfeeding, receiving an organ transplant,
receiving treatment with Rituximab within the past three to six months, or has
COVID-19 specific monoclonal antibodies in the past ninety days).
92. Id. (“[S]tudents [who are exempt] must participate in more frequent mitigation testing, quarantine if exposed to someone who has tested positive for
COVID-19, wear a mask in public spaces, and return to their permanent address or
quarantine if there is a serious outbreak of COVID-19.”).
93. See id. at *1 (stating that students are suing not only because of the
mandatory vaccine mandate but also because of the extra requirements of masking, social distancing, and testing).
94. Id. at *22. The students argued that they have a fundamental right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment based on bodily autonomy. Id.
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an exemption.95 The students stated the following issues with the vaccine
mandate:
• Ryan Klaassen was concerned that the vaccine was unsafe and
was worried that if he had to comply with the testing and
masking mandates he would be discriminated against.96
• Jaime Carini objected to the mask policy because it interfered
with her ability to work out and caused skin problems.97 Additionally, she did not believe in “surrendering her biological
information for testing” and thought the University’s policy
was “a cultural harm.”98
• Daniel Baumgartner, Ashlee Morris, and Seth Crowder all asserted they had religious objections to wearing a mask and
being tested.99
• Macey Policka believed that her age group was not at risk for
COVID-19 and thought that her dietary habits made her
more immune to getting the virus, and she had concerns
about wearing a mask while pursuing a theatre degree.100
• Margaret Roth “th[ought] masks [we]re silly and she
claim[ed] nasal swabs cause cancer.”101 Additionally, Roth
had a religious objection to the vaccine but “did not file for
an exemption because she [did not] want to be subject to testing or wear a mask.”102
• Natalie Sperazza did not seem to have objections to testing or
mask requirements, having already complied with them and
having been tested at Amazon, where she worked and sometimes got tested “just to have a break.”103
95. Id. at *13. It is because of the one student who does not qualify that the
court has standing on the issue, since all other members have an exception or
could have an exception. Id. at *14. Natalie Sperazza must make the choice between getting the vaccine or not attending Indiana University in person. Id.
96. Id. at *13 (showing Klaassen complied with the University policy during
his freshman year and has worn a mask in most places and undergone testing).
97. Id. (remarking that Carini had a doctor’s note which directed her not to
take the vaccine, though it has not been presented to the University, but she has
qualified for a religious exemption).
98. Id.
99. Id. (reporting that while Baumgartner, Morris, and Crowder all had religious objections to wearing a mask and testing, they all had previously been tested
and conformed with masking policies).
100. Id. (showing that Policka admitted to never experiencing judgment or
alienation due to wearing a mask).
101. Id. (determining that Roth has also worn masks while at school, shopping, and working).
102. Id.
103. Id. at *14 (noting that Sperazza complied with the masking and testing
requirement during the 2020 school year).
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After the students sued the University in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division, the court
denied their application for a preliminary injunction.104 When denying
the preliminary injunction, the court considered (1) whether the students
would suffer irreparable harm in the interim prior to final resolution; (2)
whether there was no adequate remedy at law; and (3) whether the students had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.105 The court
noted that the decision was not a final decision based on the merits, and
that the preliminary injunction standard is a “very far-reaching power,
never to be indulged . . . except in a case clearly demanding it.”106 The
court reasoned that the students did not meet their burden of proving
that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, that they will
sustain irreparable harm, and that the balance of harms and the public
interest favor such a remedy.107 First, it explained the students were not
likely to succeed on the merits because they could not prove that the right
to refuse a vaccination was a fundamental right that was embedded in legal history and tradition, and therefore, the right to refuse a vaccination
was merely a liberty interest.108 Further, the mandate was “rationally related to ensuring the public health of students, faculty, and staff,” which
made the student’s claim that the mandate was unconstitutional likely to
fail.109
Accordingly, the students appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision to deny the
students’ motion for preliminary injunction.110 The Seventh Circuit specifically stated that “[g]iven Jacobson v. Massachusetts . . . which holds that a
state may require all members of the public to be vaccinated against smallpox, there can’t be a constitutional problem with vaccination against
SARS-CoV-2.”111 Again, the appellate court affirmed that the students
104. Id. at *1 (noting that the students’ request for a preliminary injunction,
which is an extraordinary remedy, is denied).
105. See id. at *15 (explaining the preliminary injunction standard).
106. Id. at *15, *44 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cassel v. Snyders, 990 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2021)).
107. Id. at *15 (focusing on the students’ failure to meet the first burden of
the preliminary injunction test, which is to prove they are likely to succeed on the
merits).
108. Id. at *23 (“The students . . . offer no preliminary record of such historic
rules, laws, or traditions that would facilitate the court’s announcement. . . that a
right to refuse a vaccine is anything more than a significant liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.”)
109. Id. at *27 (“It isn’t unreasonable to believe that, absent concerted vaccination, the fall and winter months will prove more arduous than these summer
months for the university. Vastly improved, yes; out of the woods we aren’t . . . .”
Id. at *26 (internal citation omitted)).
110. See Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 7 F.4th 592, 594 (7th Cir. Aug. 2, 2021)
(affirming the decision made by the lower court to deny the preliminary
injunction).
111. Id. at 593 (citation omitted) (rejecting plaintiffs’ assertion that the rational-basis standard used in Jacobson does not offer enough protection for their
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lacked a showing that the right to not be vaccinated is fundamental.112
Further, the court noted that the case at bar was less restrictive of the
students’ rights than Jacobson was because the University created exceptions for them.113 Secondly, the mandate was less restrictive because vaccination was not a requirement of living in the state, only of attending the
University.114 Because the University had the right to set other conditions
of enrollment, like tuition and following instructions about what to read
and write, a vaccination mandate was no different.115
In an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,
the students asked the Court to block the vaccination mandate.116 Without commenting on the issue, the Supreme Court denied the application
for injunctive relief.117 With this denial, the Supreme Court did not interfere with the University’s mandate.118

interests). The court unequivocally depended upon Jacobson, clearly stating that
Jacobson bars any complaint brought against mandatory vaccination requirements.
Id. This complete dependance is an example of courts bolstering Jacobson against
attacks that it is no longer valid precedent and shows that this court, in particular,
does not consider it overruled. For a discussion of how the court in Agudath Israel
disregarded Jacobson as relevant precedent, see supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
112. See Klaassen, 7 F.4th at 593 (using Jacobson to show that plaintiffs lack a
right under substantive due process to refuse to get vaccinated).
113. Id. (noting that Jacobson lacked exceptions for adults from the vaccine
mandate, but Indiana University has exceptions for persons who declare vaccination incompatible with their religious beliefs and persons for whom vaccination is
medically contraindicated).
114. See id. (explaining that in Jacobson to live in Massachusetts you had to be
vaccinated as an adult or pay a fine, conversely Indiana University only made it a
condition of attending the school, and it is well within the school’s right to set
conditions of attendance).
115. See id. at 593–94 (stating that other conditions of enrollment, other than
a COVID-19 vaccine are normal and proper). The appellate court noted that
while the students do have a right to bodily integrity, they also had a right to hold
property, yet they surrendered 11,000 dollars a year to attend the college. Id. at
593. Similarly, the court noted that while students have a First Amendment
right—meaning the state cannot tell them what to read or write—the University
still may demand students read things they do not want to read and write things
they prefer not to write. Id. Finally, the court succinctly noted “[a]student told to
analyze the role of nihilism in Dostoevsky’s The Possessed but who submits an essay
about Iago’s motivations in Othello will flunk.” Id. at 594.
116. See Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., No. 21A15, 2021 U.S. LEXIS 3677 (U.S.
Aug. 12, 2021).
117. See id. (denying application for injunctive relief by Justice Barrett without
comment).
118. See Amy Howe, Barrett Leaves Indiana University’s Vaccine Mandate in Place,
SCOTUSBLOG, (Aug. 12, 2021, 9:40 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/08/
barrett-leaves-indiana-universitys-vaccine-mandate-in-place/ [https://perma.cc/
83HY-XUDR] (reporting that without commenting on the decision, the Supreme
Court left the district court’s decision in place).
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IV. IMMUNIZATION AGAINST ARGUMENTS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS: A NARRATIVE ANALYSIS OF KLAASSEN
In Klaassen, the district court denied the students’ petition for a preliminary injunction, noting that the students’ arguments did not satisfy the
standard of a strong showing that they will likely succeed on the merits of
their claims, that they will sustain irreparable harm, and that the balance
of harms and the public interest favor such a remedy.119 To assess
whether the student’s claim was likely to succeed on the merits, the district
court had to determine the correct mode of analysis for constitutional
questions relating to public health crises.120 Section A discusses the students’ preferred standard of review, which was strict scrutiny under the
modern tiered approach. Then, Section B explains how the University argued for a deferential Jacobson standard of review. Finally, Section C discusses the standard chosen by the court, rational basis review, and how the
court applied the standard.
A.

Stricter than FDA Approval: Rigorous Testing of Vaccine Mandate
Constitutionality, the Students’ Preferred Standard

The students urged the court to adopt the modern form of constitutional analysis and advocated for a strict scrutiny standard of review.121 In
arguing that the court should adopt strict scrutiny, the students contended
that Jacobson should be “confined to its time” and should not be considered precedent because it was overruled by Roman Catholic Diocese.122 The
court refused to consider Jacobson as overruled, reasoning that the students
did not meet the standard of implicit overruling, which requires “certain[ty] or almost certain[ty] that the decision or doctrine would be rejected by the higher court if a case presenting the issue came before it.”123
The court distinguished Jacobson from Roman Catholic Diocese, stating the
two cases “involve[ ] entirely different modes of analysis, entirely different
119. Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., No. 1: 21-CV-238 DRL, 2021 WL 3073926,
at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 18, 2021), aff’d 7 F.4th 592 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining the test
for preliminary injunctions and the heightened burden needed since they are extraordinary measures).
120. See id. at *16 (stating that the students and the University disagree on the
constitutional analysis).
121. See id. at *17. Strict scrutiny is the standard of review courts apply when a
person’s fundamental rights are at stake. Id. at *16. If the government infringes
on a fundamental right, then the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government
to “infringe . . . fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Id. (alteration in original) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
721 (1997)).
122. Id. at *18, *20 (“The students read Agudath Israel as implicitly overruling
Jacobson, or at least as abrogating it.”).
123. Id. at *20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Olson v. Pain,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 806 F.2d 731,741 (7th Cir. 1986)) (noting that the
Supreme Court may overrule a case without explicitly stating so, but it is a “tall
task”).
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rights, and entirely different kinds of restriction.”124 The issues were distinct in Jacobson because Jacobson regarded issues pertaining to public
health whereas Roman Catholic Diocese regarded the free exercise of religion.125 The court reasoned that because there was no ideological clash
between Jacobson and Roman Catholic Diocese, it could consider the two authorities “harmoniously, appreciating their respective spheres.”126
In another effort to show that the Jacobson opinion is flawed and
therefore should be “confined to its time,” the students pointed to the
court’s application of Jacobson in Buck.127 The court severely criticized
Buck, noting that eugenics is a “repulsive notion.”128 Additionally, the
court characterized the justification “that ‘[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough’” as “chilling.”129 Buck represented “a over-extension of
Jacobson,” and that such an over-extension only showed to prove that the
“Constitution cannot be cut loose.”130
The students also contended that because Jacobson predated the modern tiers of constitutional analysis, it should not be applied today.131 The
court rejected this assertation and reasoned that while Jacobson technically
predated modern constitutional analysis, this fact did not mean Jacobson
did not fit within its framework.132 The court noted that Jacobson’s “real or
substantial relation” test was “effectively rational basis review,” which asked
courts to overturn laws only when there was no legitimate state interest.133
124. Id. (“Jacobson applied what would become the traditional legal test associated with the right at issue[.]” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70 (2020))).
125. See id. at *20–21. The court made clear that the issue in Agudath Israel
was one relating the First Amendment, a right that was determined to be fundamental well before Jacobson was decided. Id. On the other hand, Jacobson related to
interests in public health, which is not a clearly fundamental right. Id. In fact, the
court notes that Jacobson endorses the intervention of the court when a law is “ ‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law.’ ” Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)).
126. Id. at *20–21 (noting that Jacobson and Roman Catholic Diocese walk “handin-hand”).
127. See id. at *20 (“Unsuccessful thus far, the students turn to Buck v. Bell[.]”
(citing Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927))).
128. Id. (describing Buck as a “rather infamous case” which upheld the involuntary sterilization of a woman in Virginia).
129. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Buck, 274 U.S. at 207) (commenting
on the inexcusable language used in Buck which likened mandatory vaccination
requirements to the sterilization order of a woman).
130. Id.
131. Id. (“Jacobson was written before the modern tiers of constitutional scrutiny, so a legitimate question is the extent to which Jacobson applies with full force
today.”).
132. Id. at *21–22 (noting that though Jacobson was decided before tiers of
scrutiny it “effectively endorsed” rational basis review of a government’s mandate
during a health crisis).
133. Id. at *18 (noting that high courts have used Jacobson in a way that reflects rational basis review analysis). The court is adopting the stance taken by
Justice Gorsuch in his concurrence in Roman Catholic Diocese when it finds that just
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The court noted that even if some parties considered their “melding of
history and modernity” incorrect, the application of both the Jacobson standard and rational basis review yield the same result.134 The court concluded that the purpose of Jacobson was to require a rational relation to a
legitimate state interest in public health, exactly what a court considers
under the rational basis review test.135
B.

Boosting the University’s Immune System: The Deferential Jacobson
Standard, the University’s Preferred Standard

The University urged the court to adopt a deferential mode of analysis and to interpret Jacobson as affording greater freedom to entities in regulating activities during a public health crisis.136 The court rejected this
argument, warning that Jacobson should not be taken too far.137 The court
advised that while Jacobson was not overruled by Roman Catholic Diocese, this
fact did not mean that Jacobson called for “blind deference to the government when it acts in the name of public health or in a pandemic.”138 The
court stated that “a public health emergency does not give . . . public
officials carte blanche to disregard the Constitution for as long as the medical problem persists.”139 The court clarifies the reach of Jacobson, noting it
dictates that governments only have the ability to create health practices
that are based in science and popular consensus.140 The court cautioned
that Jacobson did not allow states to use a global health crisis as an excuse
to make unchanging policy; instead, legislation still needed to be bound
by medicine and science, which are continually updated to respond to the
current health crisis of the country, therefore limiting the absolute power
of the legislature.141

because an opinion predated the modern tiers of analysis this does not mean it is
not applicable or relevant case law. For a discussion of Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Roman Catholic Diocese, see supra notes 59–62 and accompanying text.
134. See Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at *21 (stating that comfort should be
taken knowing that whether Jacobson does or does not follow rational basis review it
leads to the same result).
135. Id. at *20–21 (noting that both Roman Catholic Diocese and Jacobson both
applied the correct standard of review for their respective issues).
136. See id. at *21.
137. Id. at *21–22 (“The university seems to argue that Jacobson gave even
more deference than rational basis review during a public health crisis, not fairly
so; and even then, Jacobson cannot be taken once more too far.”).
138. Id.
139. Id. at *22 (alteration in original) (quoting Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley
v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2605 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting)).
140. Id. (noting that to be reasonably related to the public wellbeing, the
practices must be continually updated and tied to science).
141. Id.
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Accurate Rapid Tests, the Best Way to Combat the Spread: The Court’s
Chosen Analysis of Rational Basis Review

The court in Klaassen opted to integrate each party’s preferred standard.142 The court held that while Jacobson does not provide a more deferential mode of analysis, it also is not overruled by Roman Catholic Diocese
and the correct middle ground is to apply rational basis review.143
Under the chosen standard of rational basis review, the court stated
that the right to remain unvaccinated is not a fundamental right but
rather simply a liberty interest.144 The court looked to history and tradition to determine that the students “offer[ed] no preliminary record of
such historic rules, law, or traditions that would facilitate the court’s announcement . . . that a right to refuse a vaccine is anything more than a
significant liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.”145 The court noted
that history and tradition, in fact, supported the constitutionality of a
mandatory vaccine.146
After establishing that the students have a liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the court proceeded to balance their liberty
against the relevant state interests.147 Roman Catholic Diocese already determined that “[s]temming the spread of COVID-19 is unquestionably a compelling interest.”148 Additionally, the University reasonably believed that
142. See id. (recognizing Jacobson as a “precursor” to rational basis review
which is consistent with opinions that acknowledge Jacobson as good law).
143. For a discussion of the arguments of the students and the University, see
supra notes 121–41 and accompanying text; see also Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at
*22 (noting that rational basis review is the appropriate standard of review to
employ).
144. See Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at *24 (ruling that history and case law
do no support recognizing the right to refuse vaccination as a fundamental right,
therefore the court must deem it a liberty interest).
145. Id. at *23. In particular, the court rejected the students’ assertions that
Washington v. Glucksberg and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health support
the conclusion that the right to refuse a vaccine is a fundamental right in that it
relates to the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment. Id. (first citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); then citing Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v.
Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). The court noted that Cruzan and
Glucksberg related to the refusal of lifesaving subsistence, which had no ramifications to the physical health of others, while vaccines “address a collective enemy,
not just an individual one.” Id.
146. See id. at *24 (noting that when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
England already had a compulsory vaccination law for the smallpox vaccine, and
that considerable case law points to rational basis being the correct standard of
review).
147. See id. at *26 (explaining that determination of a liberty interest does not
end the analysis, and the Court must balance the students’ rights against state
interests).
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese v.
Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020)). Here, the court refuted the argument that because the pandemic is basically over, the compelling interest is lost. Id. Proclamations from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Indiana State
Department, Governor Eric Holcomb, and the CDC informed the court’s holding
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the vaccine promotes the safety of its community.149 It did not make an
arbitrary decision to mandate vaccines but relied on extensive studies
done by the medical experts on the restart committee.150 Thus, the court
rejected the students’ claim that the vaccine is dangerous and therefore
the students’ right to refuse it should outweigh any state interest.151 Instead, the court argued that the rarity of health risks caused by the vaccine
and the overarching benefits of the vaccine showed that the University had
a rational connection between its mandate and its aim of campus
health.152 Therefore, under the courts chosen mode of review, rational
basis, the student’s claim failed.153

that “vastly improved, yes; out of the woods we aren’t[.]” Id. In particular, the
court relied on data about the Delta variant to show that COVID-19 cases are in
fact on the rise cases reaching their greatest heights in July since. Id. at *27. The
court further noted that the surge of Delta variant cases was due to the unvaccinated population. Id.
149. See id. at *28 (determining that the decision to create a vaccination mandate was not taken lightly and was not a decision that was reached overnight).
150. See id. (showing that the restart committee relied on data from CDC,
surveillance testing, data based on vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals, efficacy of mitigation efforts on campus and more- all of which was presented in
weekly meetings that occurred over six months).
151. Id. at *29–30 (noting that the students argued that the risks of the vaccine outweigh any benefits a vaccine might confer). The risks are identified as
myocarditis, clotting, and death yet studies show that eight in one million people
have suffered from myocarditis after taking the COVID-19 vaccine. Id. at *30.
152. Id. at *29–37 (illustrating that the students’ effort to show that the vaccine is dangerous is not substantial enough to prove that the University did not
have a rational basis for implementing the mandatory vaccine requirement).
153. Id. at *38. Additionally, the court rejected arguments that the
mandatory mask and testing policy for students who had an exception violated the
students’ constitutional rights. Id. The students argued that the mask mandate
infringes on their bodily autonomy, medical privacy, religious beliefs, and essentially the students become a “scarlet letter” targeting them for bullying and scorn.
Id. at *39. The court rejected their argument that there is a fundamental right not
to be tested for a virus, or a constitutional right to not wear a mask, noting that
these rights are not deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition. Id. The
court then applied rational basis review to these challenges and determined that
the University has a legitimate interest in promoting the health and safety of its
students and that masks and testing are rationally related to achieving those measures. Id. at *40. The contention that the mask mandates were a violation of the
student’s religious freedom was dealt with separately since it involved a fundamental right. Id. at *39. But because the mask mandate was a general regulation that
had the effect of incidentally burdening religious practices in general and neutral
ways, it only needed to be rationally supported by the University. Id. Since the
right of free exercise “. . . does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a valid and neutral law of general applicability. . .” the mandate survived. Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The court also noted that students who got a
medical exemption were subject to the same requirements as those who got a religious exemption; therefore, the mandate satisfied the general applicability test. Id.
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NO MORE FALSE NEGATIVES: KLAASSEN BECOMES
CONSTITUTIONAL TEST

157
THE

MOST ACCURATE

Klaassen can be viewed as the “just right” application of deference to
Jacobson against the concern of suspending constitutional rights during a
pandemic.154 The court in Klaassen created a clear test for other jurisdictions to follow that incorporates both what is seen as the Jacobson standard
and the modern tiered constitutional analysis.155 This is the most accurate constitutional test to employ when faced with Fourteenth Amendment questions regarding regulations during a public health crisis.156
This Note suggests that Klaassen is the correct way to analyze constitutional
questions regarding public health crises, and that Klaassen definitively
states that in most circumstances mandatory vaccination requirements do
not violate a person’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.157 Section A analyzes how Klaassen both respects the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roman
Catholic Diocese and distinguishes the facts of Klaassen from that opinion.
Then, Section B explores how the Klaassen court reaffirms that Jacobson is
still good law and does not create a more deferential standard of review.
A.

Limiting the Symptoms of Infection: Klaassen’s Refusal to Elect for Strict
Scrutiny

If Klaassen represents the “just right” application of constitutional
analysis for issues pertaining to public health crises, then decisions like
Roman Catholic Diocese and Agudath Israel represent cases that could be
viewed as “extra firm” decisions.158 By employing strict scrutiny, these decisions invoked the highest standard of review for constitutional questions
regarding COVID-19 regulations—a standard which allows governmental
154. See generally id. at *21 (determining that Jacobson is still relevant precedent but does not let governments declare a public health crisis and regulate
indefinitely).
155. See id. at *22 (noting that Jacobson effectively endorsed rational basis review of a government’s mandate during a health crisis).
156. See generally Agudath Isr. v. Cuomo, 983 F. 3d 620, 631 (2d Cir. 2020)
(holding that the COVID-19 regulations imposed by Governor Cuomo were subject to strict scrutiny); see also Jones v. Cuomo, 542 F. Supp. 207, 217 (S.D.N.Y.
2021) (stating that some jurisdictions have adopted the Jacobson standard, but in
Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo the Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny stating
that Jacobson was not a “towering authority that overshadows” the Constitution).
These different outcomes are evidence that there was no clarity after Agudath Israel
was decided. See Jones, 542 F. Supp. at 219 (noting that the courts will apply both
standards out of an “abundance of caution”).
157. For a discussion of why the court adopted rational basis review, see supra
notes 125–53 and accompanying text.
158. See Roman Cath. Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (holding
that because “the challenged restrictions are not ‘neutral’ and of ‘general applicability,’ they must satisfy ‘strict scrutiny”’); see also Agudath Isr., 983 F.3d at 634 (holding that the challenges to COVID-19 restrictions must satisfy strict scrutiny).
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action only in the narrowest of circumstances.159 The decision in Roman
Catholic Diocese led lower courts to believe that the Jacobson standard was no
longer applicable and that constitutional arguments regarding public
health crisis should be subject to the strict scrutiny review.160 Some courts
even viewed Roman Catholic Diocese as a message that Jacobson had been
overruled.161 Many lower courts subjected COVID-19 restrictions that
were not relating to religious freedom to strict scrutiny as the courts tried
to apply Roman Catholic Diocese.162
Klaassen, on the other hand, should be read as the correct interpretation of Roman Catholic Diocese in that it defers to the Supreme Court but
notes that it is not applicable precedent to the issue of mandatory vaccinations.163 Klaassen artfully articulates that the issue between Jacobson and
Roman Catholic Diocese’s standards is not because one employs the modern
constitutional analysis and one predates modern constitutional analysis.164
The difference is that one regards a fundamental right—the right to freedom of religion—and one regards a liberty interest—the right not to be
vaccinated.165 Some lower courts may have overlooked this distinction,
which may have caused confusion for litigants and other courts.166
Klaassen cuts through the confusion and creates precedent that outlines a test for what standard to adopt: if the regulation infringes on a
fundamental right, then strict scrutiny is appropriate, but if the regulation
pertains to a liberty interest, then the Jacobson rational basis review standard applies.167
159. See Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at *16 (noting that under strict scrutiny
review a government action cannot infringe upon a fundamental right at all unless
the action is narrowly tailored).
160. See Agudath Isr., 983 F.3d at 635 (holding that district court’s reliance on
Jacobson was “misplaced”).
161. See Jones, 542 F. Supp. at 218 (stating that since Roman Catholic Diocese
“some courts’ confidence in Jacobson has . . . waned”).
162. See id. (explaining that two different circuit courts have applied the tiers
of scrutiny, including strict scrutiny to issues pertaining to COVID-19 restrictions).
163. See Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at *20 (holding that Roman Catholic Diocese and Jacobson “involved entirely different modes of analysis, entirely different
rights, and entirely different kinds of restrictions”).
164. See id. (“ ‘Jacobson applied what would become the traditional legal test
associated with the right at issue’—exactly what Agudath Israel did.” (quoting Roman Cath. Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70 (2020) (Gorshuch, J.,
concurring))).
165. See id. at *21 (stating that Jacobson counseled a rational relation to a legitimate interest in public health while Roman Catholic Diocese employed a heighted
scrutiny due to the interference of a fundamental right under the First
Amendment).
166. See Jones, 542 F. Supp. 3d 207, 213-14 (exploring how different circuit
courts have adopted different standards when analyzing COVID-19 mandates).
167. See Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at *21 (arguing that Jacobson counsels
courts to intervene when a fundamental right is at stake, but also noting that the
right to not be vaccinated is not a fundamental right); see also Sara M. Cooperrider
& Andrew Murphy, Mandates Exemptions, and Injunctions: the Indiana University Case
and U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, TAFT (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.taftlaw.com/
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The court in Klaassen expertly uses the Jacobson test within the framework of modern tiers of constitutional analysis.168 The Jacobson test was
used as a tool to determine if the regulation infringes upon a fundamental
right or simply a liberty interest.169 For example, the second prong of the
Jacobson test, determining if the regulation is “beyond all question, a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law[,]” is just another way to ask: is the right at issue a fundamental right or not?170 Put
another way, the court in Klaassen demonstrates that if Roman Catholic Diocese was decided under the Jacobson test, the outcome would have been the
same because the claim would have failed under the second prong.171 Because the regulation at issue in Roman Catholic Diocese was a restriction on
the right to practice religion and that right was deemed a “right secured
by the fundamental law,” and the restriction was clearly an invasion of that
right, the regulation would have been unconstitutional.172
This test applies the correct deference to new Supreme Court decisions in noting the proper application of strict scrutiny while also deferring to older Supreme Court precedent which is factually on point.173
Klaassen makes clear that Roman Catholic Diocese was not an “extra firm”
standard, creating a tougher standard to test constitutional issues relating
to a public health crisis, but instead shows that it is actually just one iteration of the possible outcomes under the Jacobson test.174
B.

Masks Still Mandated: Klaassen Confirms that Jacobson Does Not Provide
a More Deferential Standard

Just as the “extra firm” standards of Roman Catholic Diocese and Cuomo
are not the right fit for general questions of mandatory vaccination, Big
news-events/law-bulletins/mandates-exemptions-and-injunctions-the-indiana-university-case-and-u-s-supreme-court-precedent [https://perma.cc/7S75-CCN] (noting that Klaassen provides a “timely preview of the issues [COVID-19 vaccination]
lawsuits are likely to raise”).
168. See Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at *21 (“Considering the modern tiers of
constitutional scrutiny, the court reads Jacobson and [Agudath Israel]
harmoniously[.]”).
169. See id. (explaining that Jacobson counseled courts to intervene if a state
imposes a regulation that is an invasion of fundamental right).
170. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)) (showing that the second prong of Jacobson demonstrates that the court was considering fundamental rights versus liberty interests).
171. See id.
172. Id. (explaining that Jacobson “presciently contemplated” the differences
between a fundamental right, like the right to free exercise of religion, and urged
courts to intervene when a fundamental right was at stake).
173. See id. (noting that the court reads Jacobson and Roman Catholic Diocese
“harmoniously” and that the Court appreciates their “respective spheres”).
174. See id. (stating that even though Jacobson predates the modern tiers of
analysis it still conforms to what would become the traditional legal test—rational
basis review).
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Tyme Investments and Jones can be seen as the “extra soft” approach.175 Decisions such as these are based on the idea that because Jacobson was decided prior to the modern tiers of analysis, it carves out a constitutional
exception for issues relating to a public health crisis, giving the state and
the legislature more power to enact laws that can curtail one’s constitutional rights.176 The court in Jacobson put so much trust in the legislature
to make determinations about what is right to keep the larger population
safe during an epidemic, it would be easy to read such deference as permission to cut constitutional rights short.177
Just as Klaassen proved that the modern tiered analysis wasn’t actually
an “extra firm” approach, it again showed that the Jacobson standard is not
actually an “extra soft” approach and does not counsel courts to cut the
constitution loose during a pandemic.178 Instead of giving state and federal legislatures the power to do whatever they want in the name of the
greater good, the first prong in the Jacobson test—that the order have a
“real or substantial relation” to the purpose of protecting the public
health—requires that courts put bounds on the ability of the legislature to
create mandates around the pandemic.179 Klaassen notes, by following the
Jacobson standard, the courts should always consider that mandates must
be “written with a mindset that medicine and science, and the circumstances that they create, will evolve, and so must the law or policy evolve or
be revisited in amendment.”180
The court in Klaassen shows that when a court applies the Jacobson
standard, which it notes is essentially rational basis review, the constitutionality of mandates cannot be considered without the institutional
175. See Big Tyme Invs. v. Edwards, 985 F.3d 456, 466 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding
that Jacobson allowed for curtailment of constitutional rights in times of an epidemic); see also Jones v. Cuomo, 20 Civ 4898 (KPF), 2021 WL 2269551, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2021) (noting that Jacobson granted states and local authorities
with “substantial deference in enacting measure to ‘prevent the spread of contagious diseases’ ”) (quoting Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905))).
176. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26 (specifying that the liberty secured by the
constitution does not create an absolute right in each person to be free from all
restraint in all circumstances).
177. See id. at 27. The Jacobson court rationalized its deference to the legislature because,
The authority to determine for all what ought to be done in such an
emergency must have been lodged somewhere or in some body; and
surely it was appropriate for the legislature to refer that question . . . to a
Board of Health, composed of persons residing in the locality affected
and appointed, presumably, because of their fitness to determine such
questions.
Id.
178. See Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at *20 (“Jacobson merely counsels once
more that the Constitution cannot be cut loose even now, in a pandemic’s seeming
twilight.” (citing Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. 63, 68 (2020))).
179. See id. at *21 (“Jacobson doesn’t justify blind deference to the government
when it acts in the name of public health or in a pandemic.”).
180. Id. at *22.
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bounds of science and rational reasoning.181 For example, Klaassen determined that the University’s mandate was rationally related to the state’s
interest under the Jacobson/rational basis review standard.182 The mandate was rationally related because the school “reasonably believe[d] the
vaccine promotes the safety of not only its students, but that of its entire
community” and the decision to implement a mandatory vaccination requirement was not “taken lightly.”183 The court continued by citing the
numerous scientific studies that the restart committee considered when
making the decision to create a mandatory vaccination requirement, including CDC guidelines and updates, testing data, data trends based on
vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals, and more.184 By providing this
safeguard of analysis that ensured that mandates were based on science
and fact, the court showed that Jacobson does not counsel for arbitrary orders that have no reasonable relation to the state interest in protecting
public health.185
This interpretation of the Jacobson standard is the correct one in that
it shows that there is no added level of deference found within the opinion.186 Further, by disproving the fact that Jacobson allows for greater deference, the court in Klaassen indicates to other jurisdictions that it remains
good law, an indication that should be given appropriate weight in constitutional analysis.187
Klaassen is the true “just right” application of constitutional analysis
because it strikes the balance between the standard of “extra firm” and
“extra soft” and ends the confusion between the different modes of analysis to show that the standard in Jacobson, which it equates to rational basis
review, is the correct mode of analysis for considering constitutional
claims against vaccine requirements.188 Because the court delineates ex181. See id. at *26 (stating that no matter how a mandate relating to public
health is considered, either under Jacobson as a stand-alone test, or a precursor to
rational basis, the student’s liberty interest must be balanced against the states
interest).
182. Id. at *28 (“[The decision to implement a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination] wasn’t reached overnight. It wasn’t a decision taken by some fly-by-night
committee undetached from the current science, the current progress of the fight
against the pandemic, or experience and training in relevant fields of study.”).
183. Id. (reiterating that the decision to mandate vaccines was thoroughly
grounded in science as it was led by the University’s Executive Vice President for
University Clinical Affairs and the School of Medicine’s Dean).
184. See id. (noting that a “mere sampling of presentations from committee
meetings” shows the extensive data that the committee focused on analyzing).
185. See id. at *37 (holding that Indiana University has a rational basis to conclude that the COVID-19 vaccine is safe and efficacious for its students).
186. See id. at *21 (refusing to accept the University’s argument that Jacobson
gave even more deference than rational basis review during a public health crisis).
187. See id. at *22 (“[T]he law today recognizes Jacobson as a precursor to rational basis review. This is consistent with statements of many justices who continue
to acknowledge Jacobson as good law, albeit with constitutional restraint.”).
188. See id. at *26 (choosing rational basis review as the correct standard of
review for constitutional claims against the vaccine requirement, whether that is in
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actly when the Jacobson test is appropriate—whenever rational basis review should be employed—the only symptom of Klaassen will be clarity.189
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL CLARITY: A SYMPTOM

OF

KLAASSEN

With COVID-19 feeling ever-present and the relatively low vaccination
rate in the United States, Klaassen’s clear application will become a necessary precedent when other public schools and institutions create stricter
guidelines.190 For example, in Harris v. University of Massachusetts,191
which was decided a month after Klaassen, a federal judge in the District of
Massachusetts denied a preliminary injunction that was filed by students at
the University of Massachusetts, Lowell in protest of the mandatory vaccination requirement.192 The opinion did not discuss which standard
should be adopted because the court did not have to engage in a lengthy
analysis to determine if a deferential standard or the modern tiered standard was appropriate.193 However, on multiple occasions, it cited to Klaassen as an authority that provides the correct standards for constitutional
analysis.194 Accordingly, the court adopted the constitutional analysis that
Klaassen endorsed: submitting mandatory vaccination challenges to rational basis review while maintaining the language and tenants of Jacobthe form of a Jacobson analysis or under the modern tiers of constitutional
scrutiny).
189. See Jessica L. Galanos, University Vaccine Mandate Constitutionally: A Review
of the US Seventh Circuit’s IU Decision, BRICKER (August 5, 2021), https://
www.bricker.com/resource-center/COVID19/publications/university-vaccinemandate-constitutionality-a-review-of-the-us-seventh-circuits-iu-decision [https://
perma.cc/M9G6-PBVL] (purporting that Klaassen will become a signal to other
courts that clearly indicates how to analyze similar constitutional challenges to vaccine mandates).
190. See Maria Caspani & Dan Whitcomb, Rising Coronavirus Cases Fuel Resurgence Fears as Biden Ramps up Vaccination Push, REUTERS, (July 19, 2021), https://
www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/us-coronavirus-cases-risefueling-fears-resurgence-2021-07-19/ [permalink unavailable], (stating in summer
2021 that the Delta variant caused the average number of daily new COVID-19
cases to triple and that the ruling in Klaassen could “set a precedent for similar
vaccination orders in schools and business”); see also Hannah Ritchie, Edouard Mathieu, Lucas Rodés-Guirao, Cameron Appel, Charlie Giattino, Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, Joe Hasell, Bobbie Macdonald, Diana Beltekian & Max Roser, Coronavirus
Pandemic (Covid-19), OUR WORLD IN DATA, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations?country=USA#citation [https://perma.cc/47WY-ZRTV] (last visited February 27, 2022) (noting that sixty-five percent of the US population is fully
vaccinated as of February 27, 2022).
191. No. 1:21-cv-11244-DJC, 2021 WL 3848012 (D. Mass., Aug 21, 2021).
192. Id. at *1 (holding that the students did not meet the standard for a preliminary injunction and, therefore, denying their motion).
193. See id. at *6 (proceeding directly from the facts and procedural background to the substantive due process discussion without any mention of the correct standard of review).
194. Id. (citing Klaassen when determining that the Supreme Court has settled that it is within the police power for states to mandate a vaccine and when
determining that there is a legitimate state interest in mandating a vaccine).
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son.195 Additionally, the court applied the melded constitutional analysis
test Klaassen supported by noting in its opinion that Jacobson essentially
applied rational basis review.196
Opinions such as Harris are indicators that the mode of analysis
adopted in Klaassen will be the definitive mode of analysis courts should
adopt in the future.197 Clarity and consensus regarding what mode of constitutional analysis to apply is important especially because the opinion in
Klaassen can be extended to cover other public institutions, such as police
departments and cities, where similar litigation over mandatory COVID-19
vaccinations is occurring.198
Another affirmation of the court’s reasoning in Klaassen arrived when
the Supreme Court rejected Indiana University student’s application for
review. This review was the first time the Supreme court had considered
an issue pertaining to mandatory COVID-19 vaccination requirements.199
While the Court rejected the application for emergency injunctive relief
without comment, such an action indicates the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that the reasoning in Klaassen was sound and that other claims
are unlikely to succeed if they use the same argument as the students.200
Further, this decision to affirm the appellate court and district court’s decisions to deny injunctive relief may indicate that the Supreme Court approves of the district court’s interpretation of two important Supreme
Court cases, Jacobson and Roman Catholic Diocese, and the melding of modern tiered analysis with the Jacobson standard.201
While most signs point to Klaassen becoming leading precedent when
it comes to questions of constitutionality of mandatory vaccines for public
195. See id. (deciding that the right to not be vaccinated is not a fundamental
right and that Jacobson “commands a deferential standard for analyzing Fourteenth
Amendment challenges to generally applicable public health measures” and that
the state showed a “real or substantial relation” to public health and safety).
196. Id. (rejecting Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish Jacobson and citing to Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Roman Catholic Diocese v. Cuomo, which reasoned that
Jacobson applied rational basis review).
197. See Galanos, supra note 189 (clarifying while Klaassen was not decided on
the merits, the likelihood of success was decided).
198. See Jennifer Piatt, COVID-19 Vaccination Mandates- Recent Cases, NETWORK
FOR PUB. HEALTH L. (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.networkforphl.org/resources/
covid-19-vaccination-mandates-recent-cases/ [https://perma.cc/TH4Y-9TY4] (detailing the pending cases over mandatory COVID-19 vaccinations, including ones
brought by police officers and theater owners against the governor and mayor
respectively).
199. See Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., No. 21A15, 2021 U.S. Lexis 3677, at *1
(2021) (rejecting an application for emergency injunctive relief by the Supreme
Court).
200. See Howe, supra note 118 (noting that the Supreme Court denied student’s request “without comment, without seeking a response from the state, and
without referring the request to the full court for a vote”).
201. See id. (remarking that a denial without comment suggests that the other
justices did not regard the dispute as a particularly close case, therefore affirming
the reasoning of the lower courts).
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institutions, Klaassen only reviewed the issues in terms of granting or denying a preliminary injunction.202 The preliminary injunction standard is
quite a high standard to meet and calls for emergency action from the
court, rather than decisions based on the merits.203
The standard calls for students to make a showing that: (1) absent
preliminary injunctive relief, they will suffer irreparable harm in the interim prior to a final resolution; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law;
and (3) they have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits.204 Because the third prong of the test called for the court to consider the success of the argument on its merits, the court delved into substantial
constitutional analysis and determined that success was unlikely.205 The
court’s reasoning and analysis of the issue should not be seen as non-exhaustive, but it was limited to what it could review under such emergency
time limitations.206 While the standard calls for the court to determine
the success on the merits as would be determined by an ordinary issue, the
standard means that Klaassen only puts the issue to rest for now, not for
good.207
While Klaassen only represents a decision based on an appeal for a
preliminary injunction, its importance cannot be understated. Klaassen is
the first time a district court, appellate court, and the Supreme Court addressed mandatory COVID-19 vaccinations.208 By finding vaccine requirements were constitutional in this case, the court created a greater
challenge to the next party that wants to challenge mandatory COVID-19

202. See Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., No. 1: 21-CV-238 DRL, 2021 WL
3073926, at *1 (N.D. Ind. July 18, 2021), aff’d 7 F.4th 592 (7th Cir. 2021) (announcing that the Court’s decision is only in the context of granting or denying a
preliminary injunction motion).
203. See id. at *15 (explaining that a preliminary injunction is a “very farreaching power, never to be indulged [ ] except in a case clearly demanding it”
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cassell v.
Snyders, 990 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2021))).
204. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 61213 (7th Cir. 2020)).
205. See id. at *44 (“The evidence today shows that the students have little
chance of success: Indiana University is reasonably pursuing a legitimate aim of
public health for its students, faculty, and staff.”).
206. See id. (“[N]ot every stone has been unturned by the parties. Not every
witness has testified. Although constituting more than 100 exhibits and testimony
from many individuals . . . this still is a preliminary record[.]”).
207. See id. (stating that the decision is not one “after a final trial on the merits” and that the decision was “based on evidence, testimony, and briefing that the
parties produced on an emergent timetable”).
208. See id. at *14 (noting that “[n]o case to date has decided the constitutionality of whether a public university . . . may mandate that its students receive a
COVID-19 vaccine”); see also Howe, supra note 118 (stating that Klaassen was the
first test of COVID-19 vaccine requirements to arrive at the Supreme Court).
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regulations, because the next party must show more than what was offered
by the students in this case.209
Klaassen will not be the last time that the Supreme Court addresses
questions about mandatory vaccinations. In fact, the 2022 Supreme Court
docket has already been filled with mandatory COVID-19 vaccination
questions due to President Biden’s Order that over one hundred million
Americans get vaccinated.210 While these cases are paramount to building
precedent around mandatory vaccinations, they do not affect the solid,
reliable, and clear outcome of Klaassen.211 The Supreme Court overturned Biden’s order to have all private employees vaccinated because the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration did not meet the burden
for an emergency temporary standard—not because it violated a citizen’s
Fourteenth Amendment right.212 Additionally, the mandate for all medical professionals to be vaccinated to receive Medicare and Medicaid funding was found lawful not under constitutional claims, but because it was
within the power of the Secretary of Health to establish certain standards
of health and safety for facilities eligible for Medicare and Medicaid
funding.213
209. See Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at *45 (“[T]he students here haven’t established a likelihood of success on the merits on their Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim, or that the balance of harms or the public’s interest favors the
extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction, before a trial on the merits.”).
210. See Biden’s New Vaccine Requirements Draw Praise, Condemnation and Caution, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 19, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/09/09/
world/covid-delta-variant-vaccine [https://perma.cc/BCQ3-FW5J] (explaining
that President Biden’s vaccine orders will mandate that health care workers, federal workers, federal contractors, and some private sector employees get vaccinated); see also Biden v. Missouri, 142 S. Ct. 647, 654 (2022) (determining that the
Secretary of Health’s mandate for all medical professionals to get a COVID-19 vaccination was permissible); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. DOL, OSHA, 142 S.
Ct. 661, 666 (2022) (finding unlawful OSHA’s emergency temporary standard calling for all private employers with more than one hundred employees enforce
mandatory COVID-19 vaccinations).
211. For discussion about the issues raised in the Supreme Court cases discussing Biden’s vaccination mandate, see infra notes 212–13 and accompanying
text.
212. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 142 S. Ct. at 666 (“Although Congress has
indisputably given OSHA the power to regulate occupational dangers, it has not
given that agency the power to regulate public health more broadly.”). An emergency temporary standard can only be lawful when the secretary of labor shows
“(1) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or
agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or form new hazards and (2)
that the emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from such danger.”
Id. at 663. In this case, the court found that the emergency temporary standard
was inappropriate because COVID-19 was not a specific occupational hazard but
was more generally a public health hazard, therefore OSHA had extended its
reach too far. Id. at 665–66.
213. See Biden, 142 S. Ct. at 650–51 (noting that the Secretary of Health has
already established regulations much of which concern “infection prevention” and
preventing “the development and transmission of communicable diseases and infections” therefore the COVID-19 vaccination is within their power).
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While the most current litigation around mandatory vaccination has
not been brought to the court under Fourteenth Amendment issues, disputes over the validity of mandatory COVID-19 vaccine requirements are
sure to be the foremost issue in constitutional law in the future.214 Klaassen will be vital precedent because it not only has explained that such mandates do not violate a person’s constitutional rights, but it also does so
while applying the correct standard of review.215
214. See Piatt, supra note 198 (reporting that as of October 26, 2021 there are
fifty-seven pending cases on the constitutionality of COVID-19 vaccination mandates). The article notes that the common issues raised in these cases are constitutional substantive due process arguments alleging violations of fundamental rights
of bodily integrity, First Amendment based arguments, and Fourth Amendment
unreasonable search arguments. Id.
215. See Klaassen, 2021 WL 3073926, at *46 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment
permits Indiana University to pursue a reasonable and due process of vaccination
in the legitimate interest of public health for its students, faculty, and staff.”).
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